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The role of regulation in the banking industry undeniably becomes more prominent 
when its flaws endanger the homeostasis of the financial system. The goal of this work project 
is to analyse the effects of supervisory rating shocks in real activity for the European Union and 
analyse the difference in response between its Northern and Southern segments. Through the 
construction of a proxy of the CAMELS rating, and the selection of real GDP growth rate as 
the measure of real activity, I address the magnitude of the shocks through the use of a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model and the local projections approach.  
 
 







The 2008 financial crisis displayed the severe repercussions of an ever-growing level of 
interdependence in the global financial system. The crash, motivated by the subprime mortgage 
crisis, led to numerous proposals for stricter regulation of financial institutions.  
In order to meet the goal of efficient banking supervision, regulators are forced to seek to 
maintain an equilibrium. On the one hand, they aim to preserve a firm and efficient financial 
structure, protecting against systemic risk through exhaustive supervising execution. On the 
other hand, they acknowledge that these policies may unintendedly impact the banking sector 
and thus detrimentally affect the overall level of the economy.  
The evaluation of the possible negative impact of banking supervision on the growth of the 
economies is an empirical subject. Peek & Rosengren (1995) and Peek et al. (2003) suggest 
that strengthened execution of capital requirements and regulation principles led to a decline in 
credit availability, which resulted in economic activity recession. Yet, posterior evidence 
indicates that this impact tends to be temporary, variable over time and over distinctive loan 
groups, suggesting that the relationship is fundamentally nonlinear.  
In order to identify the impact of supervisory oversight meticulously, it is essential to 
monitor fluctuations in regulatory policy actions that are not connected with economic activity. 
Variations in supervisory standards can be linked with variations in the overall financial 
condition of the banking system. But if these supervisory changes are motivated by 
macroeconomic conditions’ shocks, then it can be concluded that this connection can simply 
be a sign of deteriorating economy, instead of a causal connection between both. 
Despite the interaction between the banking sector and real activity being a common topic 
of research throughout the years, rare are the studies that incorporate the role of supervisory 
ratings in this process. The research that approaches this topic majorly studies the impact of 
shocks of this nature on bank lending operations. Additionally, given that the United States of 
America are one of the few countries that adopt an easily quantifiable supervisory measure to 
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evaluate the overall financial condition of each bank, the CAMELS rating, existing research is 
almost in all focused on this country. 
With the objective of presenting a different application of such topic, this paper studies the 
effects of bank supervisory shocks on real activity for the particular case of the European Union 
and attempts to analyse the differences between its Northern and Southern segments. With 
resource to dynamic macroeconometric models imposing the Choleski orthogonalization on the 
residual variance-covariance matrix to identify structural shocks, an analysis is conducted to 
infer about the impact of CAMELS ratings variations on the real GDP growth rate.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the relevant literature 
to the topic in question. Section 3 examines the data and methodology, emphasizing the 
construction of a CAMELS rating proxy. Section 4 displays the estimation framework. Section 
5 discusses the results. And finally, section 6 provides concluding observations. 
 
2. Literature Review 
As a result of the recent financial crisis, legislators and researchers have found a revived 
attention in examining the soundness and well-being in the financial system, but most 
importantly in the banking sector. This renewed interest derives from the fresh bank failures 
that have incited governments and private depositors to find the wisest approach both to restrain 
the risk of losing their deposits but likewise to identify banks on the verge of failure. Two main 
reasons arise to justify supervising bank information: firstly, setbacks in the banking sector may 
operate as an early cautioning sign of weakening conditions in the global economy as a whole; 
secondly, one could perceive changes in lending behavior, as something that could affect the 
economy all in all (Peek et al., 1999). The Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) developed a rating system, known as the CAMELS framework. This 
framework was explicitly developed for identifying financial distress in the banking sector. The 
need for a rating system as such was originated from the previous unregulated view on banking 
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monitoring which lead to banks being bailed out with tax-payers’ money, which was wanted to 
be avoided at all cost. Initially, the CAMELS rating system was developed in order to identify 
risky banks, but the usefulness of this framework has led to broader applications in research, 
such as detecting the soundness of the financial system or predicting bank failures.  
The CAMELS ratings were used until 2009 to determine the different banks insurance costs, 
categorized after the ratings received (Kerstein & Kozberg, 2013). This framework has for a 
long time been used as a bank supervision instrument, and several researchers found that 
CAMELS ratings are linked with both performance and general bank soundness (Chiaramonte 
et al., 2015). Because of the confidentiality that surrounds the ratings, researchers have tried to 
recreate the CAMELS ratings in order to prove their accuracy of bank failure using accounting 
proxies. This offsite monitoring has shown that the CAMELS rating system can, to a large 
extent, be replicated using proxies based on available financial information (Cole & Gunther, 
1998; Roman & Sargu, 2013). Kerstein and Kozberg (2013) found that accounting-based 
proxies for each of the six categories of CAMELS were significantly associated with the 
probability of bank failure. Their research thus suggests that using accounting proxies for 
CAMELS ratings could help both depositors and investors to evaluate the overall well-being of 
the bank. Cole & Gunther (1998) found the CAMELS ratings useful but reached the conclusion 
that the ratings do decay rapidly. They found in their research that the official CAMELS ratings 
were equal or better at predicting bank failure than off-site monitoring but only if the ratings 
were less than six months old. If the ratings were given before that time frame, offset 
monitoring, like the use of financial ratios was better at predicting bank failures.  
  Although the interplay between the banking sector and real activity has always been 
subjected to a high level of research, rare are the studies that analyse the importance of 
regulatory roles in this process. Peek & Rosengren (1995) were amongst its pioneers. They 
found that preceding research documented a significant correlation between capital ratios and 
bank shrinkage but leave untested whether this relation was directly connected to regulatory 
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policy and whether it affected credit accessibility to bank-dependent borrowers. Trying to fill 
this gap, their findings indicate that the enormous decrease observed in the bank lending growth 
rate in the region of New England (USA) in the 1990s was partially motivated by the stringent 
execution of capital restrictions, as institutions contracted their assets to meet the newly 
imposed requirements. This is, given the informational and regulatory impediments that 
prevented the transfer of bank capital and credit across regions, their evidence suggests that 
New England did in fact suffer from a regulatory-induced credit crunch.  
Additionally, Bizer (1993) likewise suggests that the worse the CAMELS indicator, the 
more negatively affected the bank’s lending power. Controlling for some bank balance sheet 
and aggregate macroeconomic variables, he finds harsher regulatory requirements in the period 
between 1989 to 1992 relative to 1988, as well as an economically significant relation between 
CAMELS ratings and loan growth.  
Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (2003) use the portion of banks that were assigned a 
CAMELS 5 rating (the worst) as a tool for detecting shocks in the supply of loans. They find 
that the lending practices of these institutions change substantially when categorized as such.   
Berger, Kyle, and Scalise (2001) through the usage of CAMELS ratings examine three 
problems: first, whether there was a high level of stringency in the bank supervisors’ 
assessments during the 1989-92 credit crunch period; secondly, whether these supervisors were 
more lenient in the recovery period of 1993-98; thirdly and lastly, whether these alterations in 
the banks’ regulatory policy possessed a quantifiable influence on the institution’s lending 
practices. Their findings suggest that the level of regulatory strictness throughout the credit 
crunch period was higher than subsequently. Moreover, they conclude that bank lending 
behavior was barely influenced by the variations in the intensity of the regulatory reviews above 
mentioned. 
Deeper into this subject, Curry et al. (2008), using state-level data, explore the degree 
to which unanticipated downgrades impact state economic conditions. They arrive at the same 
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conclusion as the authors above, that is, overall growth of lending is harmfully impacted when 
supervision becomes extremely stringent. Nevertheless, the results are time-dependent given 
that downgrades appear to have impacted the growth of the economy during the 1985-93 period, 
but not as much when controlling for the 1994-2005 wingspan. They attribute this difference 
to the fact that in the first period the supervisory oversight was more severe when compared to 
the second one.  
Kiser et al. (2012) examine the extent to which variations in the CAMELS ratings of banks 
which are considered small in terms of assets (under five billion) impact their growth of lending 
between 2007 and 2010. Their findings suggest that banks who have been downgraded reduced 
their bank lending by 5 to 6 percent. Nonetheless, as well as Ramirez & Fissel (2013), an 
examination is not performed to evaluate the impact of those downgrades on the overall level 
of the economy. This leads to the investigation of Basset et al. (2012) who employ a measure 
of regulatory strictness, centered on the CAMELS framework, and a vector autoregressive 
application to examine if their developed model presents any effect on aggregate economic 
activity between 1991 and 2011. The results of the VAR model indicate a decrease of 
approximately 0.4 percent within one year. While this model examines the effects of regulatory 
strictness up to 20 quarters in advance, they conclude that the impact refrains to be statistically 
significant after about 4 to 5 quarters.  
 
3. Methodology 
In this section, I will detail the sample selected and briefly overview my empirical strategy 
to motivate my selection of different banking and macroeconomic variables. 
To achieve the purpose of this research I divided the EU in two segments, North and South. 
The former is comprised of 15 countries, and the latter of 12 (given the severity and peculiarities 
of its economy during the selected time-frame, Greece was removed from the sample). A total 
of one hundred banks were selected to represent the 27 countries. The criteria that was followed 
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to assign the number of banks to each country was the asset size of each nation’s banking sector. 
This culminated in a total of 61 banks for the North segment, and 39 for the South. The division 
by country is detailed in figure 1. Decisively, the criteria to select the different banks of each 
country was the number of total assets of each institution. 
All data collected is yearly and covers the sample period from 2007 to 2017. The main 






3.1. The CAMELS Rating 
The CAMELS ratings are a point-in-time evaluation of all meaningful operational and 
financial factors associated to six key indicators of bank health. They are, (C) capital adequacy, 
(A) asset quality, (M) management capability, (E) earnings, (L) liquidity, and (S) sensitivity to 
market risk, therefrom CAMELS. To achieve these ratings, a combination of both financial 
ratios and examiner judgement is used. Although each one of these six components gets a rating 
from 1, the best, to 5, the worst, the overall financial health of the institution is assessed through 
a composite CAMELS rating. The latter is calculated by assigning the following weights to 
each one of the 6 components: 25% to Capital adequacy, 20% to Asset quality, 25% to 
Management capability, 10% to Earnings, 10% to Liquidity, and lastly, 10% to Sensitivity to 
Figure 1 – European Union Division 
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market risk. This way, the composite rating is achieved, having the exact same scale as each 
one of the components (1 to 5).  
Consequently, an upgrade signals an improvement in the overall institution’s financial 
condition. On the other hand, a downgrade can be interpreted as a worsened financial condition. 
If this decline culminates in a rating of 4 or 5, the bank’s administration is obligated to take 
corrective action.  
CAMELS ratings are assigned during an on-site bank examination that can vary in scope 
and purpose. The regularity of the examinations depends on the bank’s health condition; 
therefore, they are normally conducted every 12 to 18 months, but every 6 months if they are 
problematic.  
Finally, each bank’s CAMELS rating and examination report are confidential and may 
not be shared with the public, even if it is on a lagged basis. This information is directly known 
only by the bank’s senior managers and the appropriate regulatory staff.  This is mainly due to 
the possible public’s reaction to a downgrade which can lead to a bank run.   
 
Rating Proxy 
Given the confidential nature of this rating framework, I use accounting-based proxies for 
the CAMELS measurement. These proxies were selected based on the financial measures that 
the FDIC assesses to rate each one of the six components of the rating, as well as the ones the 
ECB examines to analyze the banking sector.  
 
• Capital Adequacy 
Capital is an important line of defense in the event of heavy losses. This is expressly 
true for banks given that they operate with relatively low levels of capital relative to the size 
of their balance sheets.  
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The accounting proxy selected to represent this factor was the Tier 1 Capital Ratio. The 
most recent financial crisis revealed that the majority of banks had two common aspects: 
firstly, they possessed too little capital to absorb losses or to maintain liquidity; and 
secondly, they were financed with not enough equity and too much debt. Consequently, in 
2010, the Basel III international capital and liquidity standards were devised, whose basis 
is precisely the Tier 1 capital ratio. 
  
 
• Asset Quality 
This is one major vital area in assessing the overall condition of a bank. The quality of 
the loan portfolio and the credit administration program are the main elements affecting this 
area. Loans characteristically encompass the majority of a bank’s assets and convey the 
utmost amount of risk to their capital. Securities may also comprise a large share of the 
assets and also comprise substantial risks.  
For this measure, two accounting proxies were selected. Firstly, the loan-to-asset ratio 
which quantifies the total loans outstanding as a percentage of total assets. The higher the 
ratio, the least is its liquidity and hence, the higher the risk of incurring in greater defaults. 
And secondly, the impaired loans ratio, calculated as the division between the total amount 
of impaired loans and the total amount of loans outstanding. The higher this ratio, the lower 
the perceived quality of the loans is. Given that it is directly connected with the perceived 
risk of the bank’s assets, it represents a suitable proxy to measure a bank’s risk. 
 
• Management Capability 
The quality of management is possibly the single most essential component in the 
successful operation of a bank. Management examination seeks to determine whether an 
institution is capable of accurately respond to financial distress. This component mirrors 
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the management’s ability to identify, assess, sustain and supervise risks of the institution’s 
day-to-day events.  
The management component of the CAMELS rating as always been regarded as the 
most challenging one to measure through the use of accounting proxies due to its qualitative 
specification, and to acknowledge its real value, internal information is required. Given its 
elusiveness, this component is regularly left out by researchers in their respective 
investigations. Nevertheless, its widely regarded and demonstrated by these economists that 
this factor is best measured through unit cost. Furthermore, they also present validation 
proving that this “M” component is statistically significant with the composite CAMELS 
rating.  
Subsequently, the accounting proxy used in this research is the ratio of noninterest 
(operating) expense to total revenue. This efficiency ratio is a quick and easy measure to 
draw conclusions concerning the ability of banks to transform assets into revenues. 
Noticeably, if the value of the ratio increases, either the bank’s expenses are increasing, or 
its revenues decreasing.  
 
• Earnings 
The fundamental purpose, from a regulator’s viewpoint, of bank’s earnings, both current 
and accrued, is to assimilate losses and enhance capital. This factor is the primary defense 
against the risks of engaging in the banking business and denotes the first line of resistance 
against capital depletion consequential from contraction in asset value. Earnings 
performance should in addition allow the bank to continue competitive by delivering the 
means necessary to implement management’s strategic initiatives.  
Thus, the selected proxies to embody this component were the return on equity (ROE) 
and the cost-to-income ratio. ROE represents an efficiency indicator whose increasing value 
suggests the company is growing its ability to generate profit without needing as much 
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capital, and also how well a company’s management is employing the shareholder’s capital. 
The other measure, cost-to-income ratio, gives the investors a clear view of how efficiently 
the institution is being operated – the lower the ratio, the more profitable the bank will be.  
 
• Liquidity 
This component displays the capacity of a financial organization to both fund assets and 
meet financial responsibilities. Liquidity is crucial in all banks to compensate for balance 
sheet oscillations, provide funds for growth, and meet customer withdrawals. Banks must 
preserve sufficient sums of cash, liquid assets, and potential borrowing lines to meet 
projected and contingent liquidity demands.  
The first accounting proxy selected to represent the “L” component was the current 
ratio, or likewise designated working capital ratio, which is calculated by the division of 
assets and liabilities and measures the bank’s capacity to pay both short and long-term 
obligations. A ratio that presents itself in line with the industry average or slightly superior 
is commonly considered adequate. A lower than the average ratio can indicate a higher risk 
of default. Equally, if a bank possesses a very high ratio when compared to its competitors, 
it indicates an inefficient management of its assets.  
The second selected proxy was the loan-to-deposit ratio. If this ratio is too high, it 
indicates the bank may not possess the necessary liquidity to cover any unforeseen fund 
requirements. Conversely, a low value suggests the bank may not be earning as much as it 
potentially could.  
 
• Size, Sensitivity to Market Risk 
Size is considered instead of the parameterized “S” component, sensitivity to market 
risk, because most researchers disregard the latter given that to calculate it, internal 
information from the bank is frequently necessary, since the component is reliant on the 
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variation of the financial assets’ prices. This fact poses numerous complications in 
obtaining the data, and it cannot be calculated solely through accounting and financial 
information.  
Various researches indicate size as a critical component when examining bank 
soundness. They argue the importance of size, especially when it concerns large institutions 
because they are expected to be more diversified. A fundamental element in portfolio theory 
is the idea that diversification decreases the risk in a bank’s portfolio, hence decreasing the 
possibility of bank failure. Moreover, growth has been proven to affect a bank’s 
performance negatively, and so it is in the best interest of the institution to control the impact 
in its performance of an increase in size.   
Consequently, the selected accounting proxy was the ratio of the bank’s assets to the 
total number of assets of the banking sector.  
 
 
3.2. Measure of Real Activity 
 
As explained above, the objective of this study focuses on the dynamic interaction between 
supervisory ratings and measures of real activity. This way, the measure selected for this 
purpose is the real GDP growth rate. The data collected for this parameter is quarterly. 
 
4. Estimation Framework 
My experimental analysis of the relationship between variations in the CAMELS indicator 
and the measure of real activity is divided in two sections with two distinct methods. Firstly, I 
conduct a study using the structural vector autoregression (VAR) approach, with which 
identification is achieved by imposing short-run restrictions, computed with a Cholesky 
decomposition of the reduced-form residuals’ covariance matrix. Secondly, I conduct an 
application of the local projections’ methodology proposed by Jordà (2005), specifically in a 
linear framework as a close comparison with the VAR setting. 
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4.1. Vector Autoregression 
The standard approach to estimating vector autoregressive (VAR) models begins with an 
ordinary least squares estimation of the following system:  




where 𝒚𝒕 is the T × K matrix of dependent variables, 𝑩𝒑	are matrices of coefficients associated 
with different lags up to order P, and 𝒖𝒕 are reduced-form residuals. A popular alternative for 
the identification of structural shocks is the Cholesky orthogonalization of the variance-
covariance matrix of 𝒖𝒕, 𝑩𝟎. The impulse response of 𝒚𝒕 to structural shocks 𝒗𝒕 = 𝑩𝟎*𝟏𝒖𝒕 at 
horizon s, 𝚽𝒔, can be shown to be related to the parameters estimated in (1) by initializing 𝚿𝟎 
= I and then obtaining their values for longer horizons through the following recursion: 𝜳𝒔 	=
		∑ 𝜳𝒔*𝒉𝑩𝒉𝒔𝒉,𝟏  for s > 0 and where 𝐁𝒔 = 0 for s > P. Responses to the structural shocks 𝐯𝒕 are 
simply obtained by the lower triangular matrix from the Cholesky orthogonalization of the 
reduced-form shocks: 𝚽𝒔 = 	𝜳𝒔𝑩𝟎. Note that the VAR model of endogenous variables y may 
include a set of exogenous controls, x. We exclude the latter for our baseline results. 
 
4.2. Local Projections Approach – Linear Framework 
Òscar Jordà (2005) proposes an alternative method for estimating such impulse response 
functions (IRFs) via the local projections’ methodology. A distinct advantage of this approach 
is the incorporation of nonlinear endogenous variable terms that can still be estimated by 
ordinary least squares. Its linear version is immediately comparable to the VAR setting detailed 
above. It entails estimating  
	𝒚𝒕?𝒔 	= 	𝛼@ 	+	'𝑩𝒑𝒔?𝟏𝒚𝒕*𝒑
𝑷
𝒑,𝟏
+	𝑫𝒔?𝟏𝒙𝒕 	+	𝒖𝒕?𝒔𝒔 										(2)		 
 15 
at alternative horizons s  =  0, ..., S, where, again, the local projections model may be augmented 
by the presence of exogenous terms, x. Jordà (2005) then shows that impulse responses in the 
local projection framework are given by the coefficient matrices 𝜳𝒔 	= 	𝑩𝟏𝒔  while normalizing 
the impact response to be, again, 𝜳𝟎 	= 	𝑰. As in the standard VAR case, estimating responses 
to structural shocks requires post-multiplying 𝜳𝒔 by a matrix that imposes such restrictions. 
While, in principle, one could construct 𝑩𝟎𝒔  for each s, in practice, established by Jordà (2005) 
and Kilian & Kim (2011), only the 𝑩𝟎 from (1) is used for this purpose.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
As stated in the beginning, the objective of this research is to evaluate the difference in 
reaction of the economies of the North and South of the European Union to variations in the 
CAMELS ratings assigned to each country’s most powerful banks. To explore these results, let 
us divide this section in two segments: firstly, the results from the construction of the CAMELS 
rating, and then the differences in the empirical results delivered between the VAR and local 
projections’ approaches.   
Impulse responses depict a natural empirical objective given that they deliver the empirical 
regularities that authenticate theoretical models of the economy. The computation of IRFs for a 
vector time series based on Jordà’s methodology do not entail estimation and specification of 
the unknown true multivariate dynamic system itself.  
The local projections approach displays several advantages: they can be estimated by simple 
least squares; they provide appropriate inference (individual or joint) that does not require 
asymptotic delta-method approximations nor numerical techniques for its calculation; they are 
robust to misspecification of the DGP (Data generation process); and they easily accommodate 
experimentation with highly nonlinear specifications that are often impractical or infeasible in 
a multivariate context. Given that this approach can be estimated by univariate equation 
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methods, it can be easily calculated with available standard regression packages and thus 
become a natural alternative to estimating impulse responses from VARs. 
 
5.1. The CAMELS Rating 
As explained in point 3.1, the CAMELS ratings are a point-in-time evaluation of all 
meaningful operational and financial elements associated to six key indicators of bank health. 
To achieve a proxy for this rating, an extensive examination of financial ratios was conducted, 
which culminated in the calculation of the composite rating. Below, in figure 2, are presented 
two graphs, the first regarding the Northern European Union and the second the Southern 
segment, where it is possible to observe the average CAMELS rating of each country for the 





The composite CAMELS rating is ultimately achieved by assigning weights to each of its 
6 components, culminating in a value between 1, the best, and 5, the worst.  
Observing the graphs, we can check that the for the EU North the best and worst performing 
countries are respectively Luxembourg, with an average rating of 1.43, and Lithuania, with 
2.10. Meanwhile for the EU South they are respectively Bulgaria, with an average composite 
Figure 2 – Average CAMELS rating per country 
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rating of 1.42, and Slovenia, with 2.3. Moreover, it is also possible to observe that out of the 15 
countries that compose the Northern segment, only three present a rating above 2.00, that is 
20%. On the other hand, out of the 12 countries that compose the Southern one, five possess 
this characteristic.  
The results presented above are expected. Given that this rating was calculated for the top 
banks of each country in the EU, it is predictable that the CAMELS ratings assigned to each 
bank is high because on one hand, the quality of the institutions in question is strong, and on 
the other hand, the economic situation in the EU is stable. Calculating an asset weighted average 
of the CAMELS rating, a value of 1.89 is reached for the Northern segment of the European 
Union, while the Southern portion presents 1.98. From these values we can conclude from 
Trautmann’s interpretation (2006) that both segments display an “above average performance 
which means sound and relatively safe operations”, given their average CAMELS rating of 
approximately 2. 
Finally, given the main goal of this paper, taking into account this last measure, it is 
important to point out that the Northern segment of the EU displays, on average, a better 
performance than the Southern segment. Nevertheless, it is also worthwhile mentioning that the 
former’s banking sector involves, approximately, 61% of the total assets of the sample.  
 
5.2. VAR Impulse Response Functions vs. Local Projections 
In this subsection the results from the VAR model and the Local Projections’ approach 
where the real GDP growth is the measure of real activity, respectively regarding the Northern 
and Southern EU segments, are explored. Examining the IRFs for the VAR model, we can 
conclude that the majority of the responses follow the same pattern, namely, a unit shock in the 
CAMELS rating leads to an immediate decrease in the real GDP growth. This instant decrease 
is accentuated and is majorly followed by a large increase where it reaches a second significant 
peak. Finally, the shock usually seems to die out around period 10. Meanwhile, concerning the 
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Local Projections’ approach, the pattern of the IRFs is very similar to the one of the VAR, 
except for the fact that the magnitude of the effects is considerably higher, and the impact of 
the unit shock displays a higher degree of persistence given that the impulse responses exhibit 
a much more lasting effect.  
These conclusions come in line with the existing research which finds that the degree of the 
impact of supervisory rating shocks on real economic activity is small and short-lived. This is 
surprising to some extent given that corrective actions addressing financial weaknesses 
normally comprise limitations on lending and consequently would be predictable to display a 
greater impact on real activity.  
In order to verify if there is a difference between the North and South of the EU when it 
comes to supervisory rating shocks, a comparison between countries of both segments is 
conducted based on the number of total assets of the banking sector. 
Figure 3 exhibits the IRFs from the largest countries by total number of assets of the banking 
sector of the Northern EU segment, the United Kingdom (8.9 trillion assets €) and Germany 
(7.8 trillion assets €), and of the Southern segment, France (8.3 trillion assets €). From the figure 
it is observable that the IRFs are very similar, especially in the VAR model. Analyzing the 
magnitude of the response for these three countries, it is possible to conclude that the South 
displays a smoother response to the shock than the North of the EU given that the magnitude 
of the decrease in the IRF within one year amounts to approximately 0.035 for France, while 







Figure 4 exhibits the IRFs from the second tier of largest countries by total number of 
assets of the banking sector of the Northern EU segment, the Netherlands (2.5 trillion assets €), 
and of the Southern segment, Italy (3.9 trillion assets €) and Spain (2.7 trillion assets €). Again, 
when analyzing the magnitude of the response for these three countries, it is possible to 
conclude that the Southern segment exhibits a much smoother response to the shock than the 
Northern one given that the magnitude of the decrease in the IRF within one year amounts to 
approximately 0.03 and 0.05 for Italy and Spain, respectively, whereas for the Netherlands it 
amounts to roughly 0.12. 
Figure 3 – VAR and Local Projections’ Impulse Response Functions concerning the UK 






Finally, through figure 5 it is possible to create two additional comparisons. When 
contrasting the IRFs for Finland (0.55 trillion assets €) to the ones of Portugal (0.43 trillion 
assets €), and the IRFs of Estonia (25 billion assets €) to the ones of Slovenia (40 billion assets 
€), the same conclusion holds, i.e., the Northern subsection of the EU displays a much smoother 
response to the supervisory rating shock than the Southern subset. Within one year of the shock 
the degree of the decline in the IRF amounts to 0.1 for Finland when compared to approximately 
0.065 for Portugal, and it amounts to 0.075 for Estonia when contrasted to just 0.035 for 
Slovenia. 
Figure 4 – VAR and Local Projections’ Impulse Response Functions concerning the 






This work project evaluates the degree to which bank supervisory shocks, defined as 
unexpected variations in the CAMELS ratings, impacts real economic activity, namely the real 
GDP growth rate. The investigation of this hypothesis is conducted for the specific case of the 
EU using a large bank level dataset covering the wingspan between 2007 and 2017 and attempts 
to analyze the differences in response to these shocks displayed by the North and South of this 
monetary union. 
The results of the construction of a proxy for the CAMELS rating indicates a very good 
overall financial condition of the top institutions of the EU which is more than expected given 
both the magnitude of these institutions and the current economic situation that surrounds the 
EU. Furthermore, the evidence displayed by the impulse response analysis conducted through 
a vector autoregressive model and the local projections approach, indicates that the responses 
of real activity to one-unit shock in the supervisory rating are visibly smaller and smoother for 
the Southern segment of the EU in relation to the Northern one, when a comparison between 
countries with similar number of total assets in the banking sector is put in practice.  
Figure 5 – VAR and Local Projections’ Impulse Response Functions concerning Finland 
and Estonia (EU North - blue), as well as Portugal and Slovenia (EU South - orange) 
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Further research that may be conducted on this topic for the specific case of the EU should 
allow for asymmetric as well as nonlinear effects to be present, i.e., evaluate separately the 
effects of downgrades and upgrades in the supervisory rating on real activity. Although existing 
research is scarce concerning this topic, its evidence indicates that the impact is greater for 
downgrades than it is for upgrades. For example, it finds that downgrades lead to a decline in 
real GDP growth and an increase in unemployment, while upgrades do not produce statistically 
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Figure 6 – Banks selection by country  
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Figure 8 – Weighted average CAMELS rating based on the total number of assets of each 
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Figure 12 – Local Projections IRFs – EU South 
